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ABSTRACT
This study examines the various factors and related
problems involved in the mobilization of U.S. strategic
sealift assets. Specifically dealt with are the National
Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) , the Ready Reserve Force
(RRF) , and the Military Sealift Command (MSC) . How World
War II led to their inception, their roles during the
Korean and Vietnam conflicts, and difficulties encountered
are included, as well as a financial analysis of the
NDRF and RRF during Korea and Vietnam. Thoroughly discussed
are the present capabilities of the NDRF, RRF, and MSC
to effectively and efficiently respond when activated.
Current costs, material condition of units, turn-around time,
and manpower assets are considered.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this study is to examine the ability of
U.S. maritime reserve assets to effectively respond when
needed. Why and how these forces were first established,
how they have performed in the recent past, the physical
condition of their assets, and an analysis of what this
author believes to be their current problem areas will be
discussed.
In the event of a national crisis with the U.S. govern-
ment being faced with the repositioning of a large amount
of men and supplies to some far corner of the world, the
U.S. will rely heavily on maritime assets to move the bulk
of these war materials. In addition to active naval assets
available, the Military Sealift Command (MSC) , the Merchant
Marine Fleet, the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF)
,
and the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) will be called upon to
provide maritime assets in as short a response time as possible
Many factors must be considered in the activation of
these assets. These factors include: (1) the material
condition of reserve units, (2) how much time is involved
to bring reserve assets to an operational state, (3) where
the manpower assets will come from to man these reserve
units, and (4) what cost is involved to reactivate and main-
tain these assets.

This paper will explore these various factors and single
out, as a result of this research and past experience
,
potential problem areas and, finally, provide some recommen-
dations and viable alternatives to effectively mobilize
reserve assets.
B
.
PROBLEM
The situation regarding the current status of commercial
maritime assets in the United States can best be described
in the words of Mr. R.E. Casey, President, American Merchant
Marine Institute, Inc.:
While our oceanborne foreign trade expands, the
U.S. Merchant Marine contracts. Our active fleet
is too small and too old to effectively serve U.S.
economic interests, quite aside from the national
defense aspects. Once again we are ignoring the
tragic consequences of World Wars I and II which
saw America faced with a life and death struggle
for survival without an adequate merchant fleet
even to service its military forces overseas. [Ref. 1]
In lieu of its present capabilities, the Merchant Marine
is in no position to stand alone and provide the necessary
ships to support a large scale supply line to some foreign
shore, and still provide commercial shipping services.
Despite an overall increase in tonnage, the U.S. Merchant
Marine is at an all time low in numbers of ships [Ref. 2].
C. STATUS
At the end of fiscal year 1981, the U.S. -flag, privately
owned, oceangoing, deep-draft merchant fleet totaled 581
ships of 21.6 million deadweight tons (dwt) , with 522 ships
10

on active status and 59 inactive. The fleet composite aver-
aged 37,110 dwt, an age of 17.5 years, and a speed of about
18 knots [Ref . 2]
.
The active oceangoing fleet, totaling 18.4 million dwt
includes: 97 feighters, 249 tankers, 14 bulk carriers,
139 intermodal vessels (containerships , barge-carrying vessels,
and Roll On/Roll Off vanships) , 5 combination passenger-
cargo ships, 11 integrated tug-barge vessels, and 7 Liqui-
fied Natural Gas (LNG) tankers.
Of the 59 vessels in inactive status, 33 were tempo-
rarily inactive, either awaiting cargoes or undergoing
repairs and 26 were laid up [Ref. 2].
In world fleet rankings as of January 1, 1981, the
privately owned U.S. fleet placed eighth on a dwt basis and
eleventh on the basis of number of ships (see Table I)
.
The U.S. Merchant fleet has steadily decreased from as
many as 2,929 ships in 1960 to only 864 ships as of January
1, 1981. This 70 percent decrease is further amplified by
a 44 percent increase in numbers of merchant ships worldwide.
This declining trend in U.S. merchant ships is illustrated
in Table II.
D. PLAN
To provide some maritime assets, the U.S. government,
acting through the Maritime Administration (MARAD) , Depart-
ment of Commerce (DOC) , Department of Defense (DOD) , and
monitored by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
,
11

TABLE I
MAJOR OCEANGOING MERCHANT FLEETS OF THE WORLD—JANUARY 19 81
(over 1,000 Gross Ton)
Country
No. of
Ships
2,271
Rank
4
Deadweight
Tons Rank
1
% DWT
Liberia 153,342 23.4
Greece 2 ,928 1 69,559 2 10.6
Japan 1,,762 5 62,001 3 9.5
United Kingdom 1,,056 6 42,302 4 6.5
Norway 616 10 38,575 5 5.9
Panama 2,,437 3 38,011 6 5.8
USSR 2,,530 2 21,757 7 3.3
US (Privately
owned)
578 11 21,103 8 3.2
France 345 18 19,539 9 3.0
Italy 622 8 17,269 10 2.6
Spain 509 12 12,235 11 1.9
Germany 473 13 11,863 12 1.8
Singapore 622 9 11,754 13 1.8
China 695 7 10,129 14 1.5
India 370 17 9,221 15 1.4
All Others 7,,053 116,249 17.8
24,,867 654,909 100.0
Source: MARAD 81, The Annual Report of the Maritime
Administration for Fiscal Year 1981 , October,
1982.
12

TABLE II
U.S. PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT OWNED OCEANGOING MERCHANT SHIPS
(over 1,000 Gross Ton)
Year No. of 1J.S. Ships World Ship Total
1960 2 ,926 17,317
1962 2 ,733 17,861
1964 2 ,529 18,115
1966 2 ,278 18,423
1968 2 ,071 19,361
1970 1 .579 19,980
1972 1 ,150 21,009
1974 922 24,449
1975 857 22,872
1976 842 25,586
1977 840 24,096
1978 879 24,512
1979 869 24,798
1980 864 24,867
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States
,
Years 1962 to 1983.
13

would call upon the Military Sealift Command (MSC) , the
National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) and the Ready
Reserve Force (RRF) , to augment current forces.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense,
looking out for military needs, must set priorities, make
allocations of military assets, and pass on to the National
Shipping Authority (NSA) requirements not filled by DOD
vessels. NSA is a select group of experienced shipping
industry personnel empowered by MARAD to make actual vessel
assignments to the various agencies competing for reserve
shipping assets. The first group of ships to be considered
are those of the MSC. Currently consisting of 142 ships,
MSC is the initial source of sealift capability in an emer-
gency [Ref. 4]. These ships are constantly utilized in
peacetime and would form the core of a much larger fleet
required in wartime. Should the MSC fleet be considered
inadequate the government would then turn to the hiring of
commercial vessels through standard charter procedures.
The next group of ships to be called upon would come
from the NDRF. As of September 30, 19 81, the NDRF consisted
of 317 ships [Ref. 2]. However, the initial requisition
would come from the RRF. Established in 19 77, this program
was implemented to provide a sealift capability of approxi-
mately 30 ships representing 340,000 measurement tons (mts)
by Fiscal Year 1981. During Fiscal Year 1981, the actual
RRF was increased from 24 to 27 ships with a sealift capacity
14

exceeding 427,000 mts [Ref. 2]. These ships, theoretically,
could be activated within 5 to 10 days. This time frame
is far shorter than the 21 to 4 5 day window given for the
regular NDRF [Ref. 5].
This study will examine each of these maritime sources
for providing ships to the government in an emergency.
Beginning with the NDRF, the RRF, and ending with the MSC,
a brief evolution of each source will be presented along with
their present capabilities. In addition, available cost
data and an analysis of each of their perceived problems
and shortcomings will be presented.
15

II. NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET
A. BACKGROUND
The Maritime Administration (MARAD) was created as an
agency within the Department of Commerce in 19 50 and was
tasked with, among other things, the responsibility for the
preservation and maintenance of the National Defense Reserve
Fleet (NDRF) . As a result of the signing of Public Law
9 7-31, on August 6, 19 81, MARAD was transferred to the
Department of Transportation [Ref. 2],
With close cooperation of the U.S. Navy and other govern-
ment agencies, a primary responsibility of MARAD is enhancing
the ability of the U.S. Merchant Marine to provide logis-
tical support to the military services during a national
emergency. In this regard, the agency maintains the NDRF
as a ready source of vessels. These vessels are available
for use in both military and non-military emergencies, such
as a commercial shipping crisis [Ref. 2].
The NDRF was created as an offshoot of the Merchant Ship
Sales Act of 1946. This act was established at the end of
World War II to dispose of some 5,000 odd vessels created as
a result of the war. It soon became apparent to the govern-
ment that a majority of these surplus ships would remain
unsold and, consequently, unused. Because of this problem
the NDRF was created. These ships would remain idle but
available for service when needed and were moored at nine
16

different sheltered anchorages located throughout the United
States. The locations on the Atlantic Coast were: Hudson
River, New York; James River, Virginia; Baltimore, Maryland
and Wilmington, Delaware. The Pacific Coast locations were:
Suisun Bay, California; Astoria, Oregon and Olympia, Washing-
ton. The Gulf Coast locations were at Beaumont, Texas and
Mobile, Alabama.
Specifically, the act states:
The Commission shall place in a National Defense
Reserve (1) such vessels owned by it as, after con-
sulting with the Secretary of War and the Secretary
of the Navy, it deems should be retained for national
defense, and (2) all vessels owned by it on
December 31, 1947, for the sale of which a contract
has not been made by that time... a vessel placed
in such reserve shall in no case be used for com-
mercial operations , except that any such vessel
may be used during any period in which vessels may
be requisitioned under Section 902 of the Merchant
Marine Act of 19 36, as amended. [Ref. 6]
At the beginning of the Fiscal Year 19 4 5 there were
1,421 NDRP ships dispersed at these nine locations. By
1950 this total peaked at 2,277 ships. However, by 19 78
the NDRF had shrunk to 308 ships. Currently there are 317
ships in the NDRF. Table III is a breakdown of the total
number of NDRF ships by Fiscal Year.
As of September 30, 19 81, there were 317 ships in the
NDRF located at three locations, one on each coast. These
locations were: James River, Virginia, on the east coast;
Suisun Bay, California, on the west coast and Beaumont,
Texas, on the Gulf Coast. Table IV breaks down the current
number of ships moored at these three locations and their
current status [Ref. 2].
17

FISCAL
YEAR
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
TABLE III
NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET— 19 45 TO 19 81
NO. OF FISCAL NO. OF
SHIPS YEAR SHIPS
5 1964 1739
1421 1965 1594
1204 1966 1327
1675 1967 1152
1934 1968 1062
2271 1969 1017
1767 1970 1027
1853 1971 860
1932 1972 ' 673
2067 1973 541
2068 1974 487
2061 1975 419
1889 1976 348
2074 1977 333
2060 1978 306
2000 1979 317
1923 1980 320
1862 1981 317
1819
Source: MARAD 81, The Annual Report of the Maritime
Administration for Fiscal Year 1981 , October,
1982

TABLE IV
NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET
SEPTEMBER 30, 19 81
NDRF
LOCATIONS
James River,
Va.
Beaumont,
Texas
Suisun Bay,
Ca.
TOTAL:
RETENTION
107
46
82
235
SCRAP
CANDIDATES
19
SPECIAL
PROGRAMS TOTALS
41
25
11
57
167
52
98
317
Source: MARAD 81, The Annual Report of the Maritime
Administration for Fiscal Year 1981 , October,
1982
During Fiscal Year 1981, 23 ships were added to the
fleet and 31 withdrawn. In the Retention category are those
ships maintained for emergency activation under the fleet
preservation program. There are currently 227 ships in the
program [Ref. 2].
In 1951 authorization for the sale of NDRF ships to
operators for commercial trade purposes expired. There-
after, NDRF ships could only be sold for scrap, for non-
transportation purposes or broken out only in time of
national crises [Ref. 7].
During Fiscal Year 19 81, IVLARAD sold for scrapping or
non-transportation uses 12 Government-ovmed vessels, with
a total return to the government of $2,553,635. From 19 58
19

through 1981, a total of 2,307 vessels were sold for such
purposes, with an aggregate return of $201,300,000.
In October 198 0, two obsolete vessels were sold for
$651,000 for conversion and operation in the fisheries or
domestic coiranerce of the United States, as authorized by
Public Law 96-260 [Ref. 2].
Only 147 ships are of the general cargo variety [Ref. 8]
Victory-class ships account for 130 of the general cargo
ships. These World War II freighters are driven by steam
turbine power plants which enable them to maintain speeds
between 15 and 17 knots. With a lift capacity of approxi-
mately 10,800 dwt and permanently installed cargo handling
equipment, each ship has the flexibility to provide sealift
to almost every overseas destination [Ref. 9]. Figure 2.1
lists the principal characteristics of the Victory-class
ships.
The remaining ships in the general cargo category
consist of 11 Seatrains, 1 container carrier .(P-6-SE-PSI)
,
and 5 Mormacpride- class ships (C-3-S-33A) [Ref. 10].
The principal characteristics of the Seatrain ships are
listed in Figure 2.2. The Mormacpride-class ships, a rela-
tively new addition to the NDRF , were built in the early
1960 's and possess the characteristics of being bigger,
faster and more suited to current-day sealift requirements.
Figure 2.3 lists the principal characteristics of this
class ship.
20

Length, overall
Length between perpendiculars
Beam, molded
Depth, molded to main deck
Draft maximum for scantlings and
at Subdivision
Fuel Oil Capacity, double bottom
tanks
Fuel Oil Capacity, deep tanks
Fuel Oil Capacity, settling tanks
Total Fuel Oil, tanks 98% full
Total dry cargo (Grain)
Total dry cargo (Bale)
Total Fresh Water
Booms, Fourteen
Booms , One
Booms , One
Crew
Passenger Accommodations
Propelling Machinery
Normal. S.H.P.
Service Speed
455'-3"
436'-6"
62'-0"
38 '-0"
28'-6"
1235.8 Tons
1518.6 Tons
128.2 Tons
2882.6 Tons
523,740 C.F.
453,210 C.F.
294.9 Tons
5 Tons
30 Tons
50 Tons
58
None
High Pressure Steam
Turbine Double Red. Gear
8500
16.5
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Ready Reserve Fleet
Plan, Maritime Administration, December 1977
Figure 2.1 Victory Class—Principal Characteristics
21

Length, Overall 559 '-11"
Breadth (Molded) 68 '-0"
Depth (Molded to Main Deck) 39 '-3"
Height (Keel to Span Deck) 62 '-3"
Maximum Draft Loaded 27 '-0"
Light Ship (Including Ballast) 10,663
D.W. Tonnage (At Deep Draft) 10,337
Displacement Tonnage 21,00
Fuel Capacity (BBLS.) 16,50
Shaft H.P. 10,000
Speed (Knots) 16.5
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Ready Reserve Fleet
Plan, Maritime Administration, December 19 77
Figure 2.2 Seatrain—Principal Characteristics
22

Length, Overall
Length, Waterline
Length between Perpendiculars
Breadth Molded
Depth to Main Deck Side
Draft Mean, Full Load
Draft, Scantling
Displacement, Light Ship
Fuel Oil, Tons
Fresh Water, Tons
Stores, Tons
Personnel and Effect, Tons
Misc. Deadweight, Tons
Dry Cargo, Tons
Refrigerated Cargo, Tons
Cargo Oil, Tons
Cargo Deadweight
Total Deadweight
Displacement, Full Load
Cargo Volume, Bale
Cargo Volume, Grain
Cargo Volume, Refrigerated
Cargo Volume, Oil
Passenger Accommodations
Crew Accommodations
Propelling Mach
Shaft Horsepower, Normal
Service Speed-Knots
Booms
483'-3"
4 64'-0"
458'-0"
68'-0"
41' -6"
28'-6"
31 '-9"
5;920
2,082
127
40
a
57
4,937
399
2,830
8,166
10,480
16,400
544,872
604,377
33,900
113,198
12
55
High Pressure Steam
Turbine
Double Red. Gearing
11,000
18
5-ton, 10-ton and
1-60/75 ton
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Ready Reserve Fleet
Plan, Maritime Administration, December 19 77
Figure 2.3 Mormacpride Class—Principal Characteristics
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The remaining ships are naval auxiliaries and non-
retention candidates. The naval auxiliaries consist of
mine-sweepers, tugs and other types not appropriate for the
transportation of military cargo. The non-retention group
consists of special program ships (i.e., the fish reef
program, military assistance programs, ships being held
for spare parts support, and ships being held for scrap)
[Ref. 9].
B. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
NDRF ships have been utilized for national defense
purposes twice since the end of World War II. These ships
were called upon for service during Korean hostilities and
in support of military operations in Vietnam.
1 . Korea
From mid-March through December, 19 51, the National
Shipping Authority (NSA) authorized the withdrawal of 443
ships from the NDRF to facilitate the return of U.S. lines
ships from military support roles to their peacetime trade
routes. Because of their limited service and brief layup
period since the end of World War II, these ships were able
to be reactivated in a relatively short period of time at
an average cost of only $135,000 per ship. By the second
quarter of 19 52, the number of reserve ships in service
decreased rapidly to 183. As the demand for additional
shipping subsided, these ships were returned to the NDRF
sites at an average layup cost of $19,000 per ship [Ref.
11].
24

No. of Ships Cost Per Ship Total
Activation Cost 443 $135,000 $59,805,000
Layup Cost 44 3 19,000 8,417,000
Totals: $154,000 $68,222,000
The private operators were responsible for overseeing
repairs, providing a crew, and general provisioning. The
government paid for the break-out costs and activation costs
in addition to the private operators' expenses and fees.
During Korean hostilities the break-out of NDRF ships
required little preparation since these ships were still
fairly new. Consequently, break-out times were excellent,
averaging slightly more than three ships every two days.
Only a slight amount of repair was necessary during the
reactivation process; in general, the hull, machinery, deck
gear, and spare parts onboard each reserve ship were ade-
quate for the task at hand. Replacement parts, if not
available within the reserve fleet itself, were still avail-
able from the original suppliers [Ref. 9].
The average ship age of less than ten years was a signi-
ficant factor contributing to the overall costs and speed
in which these 443 reserve ships could be brought up to
an operational condition in support of the Korean conflict.
However, as the next section will demonstrate, Vietnam
was an entirely different situation.
25

2 . Vietnam
During the three primary buildup years of the
Vietnamese conflict, 1965-1968, 172 NDRF ships transported
in excess of 6,800,000 tons or 28 percent of military
cargo shipped to Southeast Asia [Ref . 12] . By 1970 a total
of 17 3 NDRF ships moved more than 30 percent of all cargo
to Southeast Asia.
In July of 1965, 1,594 ships were in the NDRF but
only 960 were under preservation [Ref. 13]. These ships
were maintained under a program of contact preservation
where various preservation coatings are applied to the in-
terior and exterior of the ships. This preservation method
along with a general neglect since their use in Korea
accounted for most of the problems during the initial acti-
vation phase. Consequently, the average activation time
for the first 14 ships withdrawn from the NDRF was 21 days
which was accomplished on an around-the-clocJc basis. The
average activation time for the next 37 ships was considerably
greater at 42 days. This increase in activation time was
mainly attributed to: (1) the generally degraded condition
of the ships, (2) a greater amount of repair work required
and (3) a lack of repair yard capacity creating backlogs.
Table V reflects the average days in the shipyard to acti-
vate the first 101 NDRF ships in 1965.
Thus, it can be readily seen from Table V that the
average days to activate the first 101 NDRF ships was 47.5
26

TABLE V
Activation Periods of First 101 NDRF Ships— 19 65
No. of Ships in Group
14
8
28
1
25
6
6
6
7
Average Days in Shipyard
21
41
43
31
53
67
64
64
64
Total: 101 47.5
Source: U.S. Department of Coininerce, Ready Reserve Fleet
Plan, Maritime Administration, December 19 7 7
days per ship. More significant is the trend of the aver-
age which is more than two months per ship for the last
2 5 ships. Compared to the reactivation time for the Korean
hostilities, this was indeed a significant change and was
considerably longer than initially envisioned.
The average shipyard costs to reactivate, maintain
and repair, and deactivate NDRF vessels during Vietnam were
as follows:
Reactivation Cost
Maintenance & Repair
Deactivation Cost
No. of Cost Per
Ships Ship Total
161 $476,937 $76,786,857
173 490,984 84,940,232
123 45,392 5,583,216
Totals: $1,013,313 $167,310,305
27

Thus, the average total cost to the government to
break-out and reactivate a NDRF ship for the Vietnam con-
flict was $1,013,313 per ship, which was considerably more
than the $154,000 per ship for Korea. Each ship that
was broken-out for service cost the government approximately
$491,000 through April, 1966. Although this amount seems
quite acceptable today, in 1966 it was a source of consider-
able concern to both MARAD and DOD [Ref . 15] . These figures
have not been adjusted for inflation over those 15 years but
price changes were moderate during this period with the
increase of the GNP deflator from 19 50 to 19 65 being only
39 percent.
Although the NDRF performed satisfactorily during
the Vietnam conflict, the material condition and general
responsiveness of the fleet was far below the standards
that prevailed during the Korean conflict. This was to be
expected, if for no other reason than that the ships had
aged during the interwar period [Ref. 16].
C . PROBLEMS/SHORTFALLS
In addition to the initial costs to bring NDRF ships
into service other problems were encountered. Among the
most significant were:
1 . The Acute Shortages of Seagoing Manpower
During Korean hostilities the number of seamen jobs
increased dramatically from 57,000 in June, 19 50 to 87,000
in June, 19 51, an increase of 53 percent in one year [Ref.
28

7] . High wages and plentiful job opportunities ashore
coupled with the uncertain future of a long career at sea
contributed to the large number of unfilled seagoing billets.
This shortage of skilled seamen in all ratings, in both crew
and officers seriously delayed many sailings. As a result
the reactivation process was hampered by these shortages in
skilled seamen [Ref. 11].
Essentially, the same problem existed when reacti-
vating ships for the Vietnam conflict as existed for the
Korean hostilities. The large increase in demand for sea-
going manpower far exceeded readily available assets. In
spite of massive recruiting campaigns sponsored by both
MARA.D and MSC, this manpower shortage significantly con-
tributed to sailing delays of NDRF ships [Ref. 11] . Although
unsubstantiated, the fact that the Vietnam operation was a
highly unpopular issue certainly must have also contributed
to the recruiting problems experienced in 1966 through 1968.
Table VI illustrates the delayed sailing days for those
years
.
In addition to delays in sailing times, many ships
had to sail shorthanded. This problem is illustrated in
Table VII.
Based on operating costs of from $2,700 to $3,500
per day, it is estimated that $7,089,400 additional costs
were incurred due to these sailing delays. See Table VIII
[Ref. 7].
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TABLE VI
Ship Sailings Delayed in Vietnam Due to Crew Shortages
Year Sailings
No. Sailings
Delayed
% Sailings
Delayed
Days
Delayed
1966 323 160 50 548
1967 563 245 44 833
1968 519 187 36 829
Total: 1,,405 592 42 2,210
Source: CNO Report, Sealift Requirements Study, Third
Progress Report , December, 19 6 7
DATE
TABLE VII
Shorthanded Complements for 19 6 6 and 19 6 7
SHORTHANDED COMPLEMENTS
TOTAL LICENSED OFFICERS UNLICENSED—SKILLED
SAILINGS
^^Q^ Ei^Q^ DECK ENG . STWD
Jan-Dec
1966 323 226 346 29 48 6
Jan-June
1967 286 141 211 24 47 8
Total 609 *367 *557 *53 *95 *14
*
Total of Shorthanded billets
Source: CNO Report, Sealift Requirements Study, Third
Progress Report , December, 19 67
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TABLE VIII
Additional Costs Due to Crew Shortages—1966 to 19 6i
ESTIMATED
DELAYED DELAYED ADDITIONAL
YEAR SAILINGS
323
SAILINGS
160
DAYS
548
COSTS*
1966 $1,479,600
1967 563 245 833 2,708,300
1968
_
519 187 829 2,901,500
TOTAL 1 ,405 592 2,210 $7,089,400
Based on operating costs of from $2,700 to $3,500
per day exclusive of fuel costs.
Source: International Maritime Associates Inc.,
National Defense Reserve Fleet Response Plan
,
1976
Another contributing factor to these shortages is
the age of these ships. The technology is old and the
seamen who can operate this technology are no longer avail-
able as a result of attrition or that they are most likely
geinfully employed in other endeavors.
2 . Shipyard Availability/Capability
During the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, the ship-
yard capabilities were sufficient to meet the necessary
demands. However, in recent years the size of our merchant
fleet has been shrinking, so it follows that the number of
shipyards required to support them has decreased also. And
unless replaced by newer vessels, the older these ships
get, the length of time spent in shipyards undergoing
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reactivation repairs/maintenance increases. Consequently,
if it again becomes necessary to activate a large number of
NDRF ships, it is anticipated that to do so will require
more time than in the past.
In order to activate a Victory ship from the NDRF
in 19 77 it was projected that it would take thirty to forty
days. DOD concluded that this time frame was unsatisfactory
and deemed that a five to ten day break-out period for
thirty Victory ships was necessary [Ref. 11],
It becomes apparent that in order to shorten NDRF
break-out times the NDRF must be better maintained or that
older ships be systematically replaced with newer more
operational vessels, or create a RRF.
3 . Material Condition of Reserve Ships
As can be surmised from its history, the considera-
tion which is the most fundamental to activation of the NDRF
is the material condition of the ships. Upon this condition
depend two closely associated areas of concern, cost and
turn-around time, each of which could prove prohibitive to
future reserve fleet utilization. Despite the fact that the
majority of the ships in the NDRF have reached an unprece-
dented age, due to their limited active ser'vice life and
major upgrading during Southeast Asian operations, they are
considered by many officials to represent a significant
future service capability. However,- how long these ships
can be maintained under the present reserve fleet preserva-
tion program in a state conducive to reactivation is an
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unknown factor. Excluding the nine ships dedicated to the
RRF, there are now 137 ships whose material condition is a
source of keen DOD and Congressional interest [Ref . 8]
.
Prior to 1970, ships designated for retention were
preserved using the contact preservation method. This
process consisted of coating vital machinery and exposed
metal surfaces with special oil, grease, and contact mater-
ials designed to arrest corrosion. However, it was dis-
covered during the Vietnam reactivation efforts that these
coatings slowly hardened and proved very costly and time-
consuming to remove [Ref. 11].
4 . Casualties and Ship Reliability
During the initial operating period of approximately
one year, about 70 percent of the 51 ships activated in 1965
suffered casualties resulting in lost time averaging 10
days per ship [Ref. 7] . However, over the long run, the
majority of the reactivated ships performed in an adequate
manner. Based on the operating statistics of 68 ships in
service from 17 July 1965 to 1 February 1966, out-of-service
time amounted to 4.75 percent as compared to about 3.5
percent under normal operations. Boilers accounted for
about one third of all casualties. Other frequent break-
downs were caused by:
1. Condensers
2. Electrical Systems
3. Fresh Water Evaporators
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4 . Piomps
5 . Main Engines
6. Refrigeration
7. Piping
8. Electronic System [Ref. 11]
D. PRESENT CAPABILITIES
In 1977, the trade-in of five C-3 break-bulk ships
constructed in 19 60-71 provided a more modern basis for the
NDRF . Additionally, the Seatrain series of ships already in
the NDRF, which are self-sustaining, presented to military
planners a better alternative and a more efficient method of
carrying vehicles and helicopters. Finally, the addition
in 19 78 of three Mariner Class vessels constructed in the
1950s further offered newer, faster, and more modern ships.
See Figure 2.4 for a list of Mariner Class characteristics.
Although special attention has recently been given to
the RRF ships it has not degraded the remaining ships in the
NDRF. Even though the Victory Class ships are not utilized
as much in the RRF as first planned, they still constitute
the largest, 130 out of 218, group of ships in the NDRF
retention list for defense purposes [Ref. 19].
According to the Department of Commerce the ships of the
NDRF are deemed to be in good condition and properly main-
tained. This is primarily due to the dehumidification sys-
tem which has virtually eliminated interior corrosion and
deterioration caused by moisture. Specialized equipment is
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Length Overall
Length between perpendiculars
Beam, Molded
Depth to Main Deck, at side
Depth to 2nd Deck, molded at side
Bulkhead Deck
Machinery
Designed Sea Speed
Shaft Horsepower, Normal
Shaft Horsepower, Maximum
Full Load Draft, molded
Full Load Displacement
Light Ship Displacement
Passengers
Crew
Grain Cubic
Bale Cubic
Reefer Cubic
Fuel Oil (double bottom &
settling tanks)
Fuel Oil (Deep Tanks)
Fuel Oil, Total
Fresh Water
No. of Holds
Gross Tonnage
Net Tonnage
563'-73/4"
528'-0"
76 '-0"
44'-6"
35'-6"
2nd. Deck
Turbine
20 Knots
17,500
19,250
29 '-9"
21,093 Tons
7,675 Tons
12
58
837,305 Cu. Ft
736,723 Cu. ft
30,254 Cu. ft.
2,652 Tons
1,156 Tons
3,80 8 Tons
257 Tons
7
9,215
5,367
Source: Military Sea Transportation Service Supplement,
Loading A Mariner-Class Ship , Bureau of
Personnel, 19 62
Figure 2.4 Mariner Class—Principal Characteristics
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installed to lower the relative humidity and maintain it
within the 35 to 45 percent range. Within this dry atmos-
phere, corrosion and deterioration of equipment is severely
retarded. In addition, the ship hulls are protected by an
electrocathodic protection system to minimize underwater
hull deterioration through corrosion or electrolytic action.
The underwater portion of each retention ship is protected
by a unitized cathodic grid through which an electric cur-
rent is applied. The electricity passing through the water
to the steel hull renders it inert and highly resistant
to oxidation.
However, this is not to say that all 137 retention ships
in the NDRF are in a high state of repair or preservation,
for such is definitely not the case. It only means that the
preservation program utilized is effective in maintaining
the superstructure, hull and interior of a Victory or
Seatrain Class ship in the same condition as when delivered
for layup [Ref. 16].
In addition, the results of inspection reports conducted
on the material condition of the ships of the James River
fleet indicated that there were numerous secondary areas
open to question:
1. Most if not all deck electrical wiring would need to
be replaced.
2. Shipboard systems which were disconnected have not
been tested in at least eight years.
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3. Additional problems were sited in galleys, mess-
rooms, crew quarters, electronic equipment, lifeboats,
cargo handling gear, generators, reefers, flaking
paint, and deck deterioration. [Ref. 20]
The report also noted for future planning purposes that
the majority of these ships would cost between $1.8 and 2.0
million and require from 60 to 70 days in a repair yard,
per ship, for reactivation for an emergency use [Ref. 20].
The deterioration in the reserve fleet's material condi-
tion has also been hastened by a pronounced lack of budge-
tary emphasis by MARAD. The reserve fleet allocations over
the past eight years have been consistently less than one
percent of the total MARAD budget. With the increasing
age of the Victory Class ships and increasing maintenance
costs, holding reserve fleet funding constant has had an
adverse effect on the material condition of the NDRF
.
Although the NDRF is maintained in a relatively high
state of readiness and preservation, a certain amount of
shipyard work would have to be accomplished if the ships
were required for service. However, of the shipbuilding
industry's 250 firms that repair ships, only 65 are capable
of drydocking ships 300 feet or longer. For ships of this
size, the repair industry has a total of 128 drydocking
facilities; 73 floating drydocks , 50 graving drydocks, and
5 marine railways [Ref. 21]
.
A competent shipyard workforce is another major concern
to meet future national defense requirements in activating
/
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NDRF ships. The Shipbuilders Council of America has pre-
dicted a steady decline in numbers of shipyard workers. This
decline can be attributed to various factors such as an
aging workforce with much of it dating back to World War
II and the Korean conflict, and therefore eligible for retire-
ment en masse. Additionally, the council's forecast for
revenues reflects a general decline in merchant and naval
shipbuilding with a slight increase in ship repair volume
[Ref . 22] .
E. SU^4MARY
The creation of the NDRF after World War II was a logi-
cal decision to make because of the large quantity of ships
which were in disuse immediately after the war. Consider-
ing the lessons learned from the World War II experience,
the United States did not want to find itself again in a
similar situation to move large quantities of war materials
but no way to effectively do it. Consequently, the NDRF
became a reality. Because the Korean situation occurred so
soon after the conclusion of World War II, the NDRF ships
were easily reactivated since the ships were available, the
shipyards were available, the manpower was still available,
and, as a result, the reactivation costs were relatively
cheap. But as the Vietnam build up got underway fifteen
years after the Korean conflict ended, the situation had just
about reversed itself.
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An obvious solution would be to have a manned merchant
fleet, in reserve, always ready to mobilize when needed.
This of course would be exceedingly uneconomical. The
alternatives are to continuously upgrade the NDRF by con-
stantly cycling through newer and more technologically
advanced ships that are capable of handling military cargo
requirements and are self-sustaining. But the manpower
problem still remains as a significant factor. Another
alternative would be to create an operational but readily
accessible fleet of ships such as in the Military Sealift
Command (MSC) , where ships are currently manned and opera-
tional but under the control of the Navy and be readily
available when required.
The MSC and the use of current merchant marine assets
will be the subject of further analysis in later chapters.
The Ready Reserve Force (RRF) was created in an effort to
address some of the problems noted with the NDRF and will be
discussed in the following chapter.
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III. READY RESERVE FLEET
A. BACKGROUND
Current DOD planning requires supplementary shipping
be ready within the first two weeks of a coiranitment of U.S.
forces. In response, the Maritime Administration and the
Navy have established a Ready Reserve Force (RRF) within the
NDRF. Under this program ships are upgraded and maintained
in a state of readiness ao as to provide a dedicated fleet
which can be placed in service within ten days.
The events which led to the establishment of the RRF
began in early 19 76 when MARAD, in its role as reserve
fleet administrator, conducted an analysis of the time re-
quired to break out ships from reserve status. The result
of MARAD ' s examination indicated that activation of reserve
shipping could not be accomplished in the DOD-specified
five to ten day period. The MARAD activation estimate was
from thirty to forty days [Refs. 9,11].
The reasons for this degraded response capability were
excessive age, ships maintained in the same degraded material
condition as when deactivated, lack of NDRF repair and over-
haul equipment, and limited availability of private repair
and drydocking facilities. These findings were further
corroborated by an independent GAO report, dated 6 October
19 76, which reported the results of a review of the capa-
bility of the U.S. fleet to meet contingency requirements
[Ref. 23].
4

These MARAD evaluations and GAO report results are
what led up to the initial 30 reserve. Victory Class ship
requirement. This upgrading of a portion of the NDRF' ships
was to be conducted by a MARAD-proposed four-phase program
which was estimated to cost $1.5 million per ship.
An agreement between the Department of Commerce and
the Navy resulted only after the Navy stipulated: that the
specific ship mix and type, total number of ships, and
future changes in the composition of the RRF be at the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) discretion, and subject to
agreement by the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Maritime
Affairs [Ref . 6]
.
In an effort to have NDRF ships be more responsive to
emergencies, in June 19 75 MARAD initiated a 5-year program
to provide the U.S. Navy with sufficient shipping to accommo-
date a sealift capability of approximately 340,000 mts.
Selected ships of the NDRF are upgraded to RRF status and
can be activated for sealift operations on 5 co 10 days
notice; an average of 4 weeks is required to activate other
NDRF vessels [Ref. 2]
.
In November 19 76, a Memorandum of Understanding between
the Department of Commerce and the Navy provided for the
establishment, maintenance, and control of the RRF as part
of the NDRF. This memorandum sets forth the conditions
under which the specified ships will be held in a ready
reserve status until needed by the Department of Defense.
The goal of the RRF, a joint MARAD-Navy project, is to
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provide a quick-response sealift capability for U.S. mili-
tary emergencies. Under the current RRF program, MARAD will
maintain approximately 30 ships in an advanced state of
readiness. The selected ships will meet all of the require-
ments of the American Bureau of Shipping, and the U.S.
Coast Guard requirements for Certificates of Inspection.
Funding for upgrading ships for the RRF program is provided
by DOD [Refs. 2,5]
.
In 1979, the RRF consisted of 27 ships with a sealift
capacity exceeding 427,000 mts . Table IX presents the 19 79
RRF inventory.
B. PRESENT CAPABILITIES
Although the initial plan for the RRF was that it be
composed of 30 World War II, Victory Class ships, the
program was changed almost immediately. In 19 77, the
trade-ins of 5, C-3 break-bulk ships constructed in 19 60-61,
and the addition in 1978, of 3 Mariner Class ships constructed
in the 1950 's, gave the NDRF, along with the Seatrain series
ships, a more modern and faster selection of ships to be
maintained in a RRF status. Consequently, MARAD in con-
junction with the Navy, altered the objectives of the RRF.
Henceforth, a variety of ship types rather than exclusively
Victory Class ships would be utilized to accommodate the
340,000 mts requirement as originally planned. As depicted
in Table IX, in 1979 the RRF inventory had already consisted
of 27 ships. By May 19 83 this inventory had increased to
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TABLE IX
Ready Reserve Force Ships— 19 79
TYPE
CS-S-33a
C3-S-33a
C3-S-33a
C3-S-33a
C3-S-33a
VC2-S-AP2
C4-S-1P
C4-S-1H
C4-S-1H
NAME
Pride
Bay
Cove
Scan
Lake
Catawba Victory
Lone Star Mariner
Old Dominion Mariner
Cracker State Mariner
Container Carrier Washington
*LSD 8 Ships
AG's 9 Ships
*Potential RRF Candidates
LOCATION
James River
James River
James River
James River
James River
James River
James River
James River
James River
Beaumont
James River
Suisun Bay
James River
Beaumont
Suisun Bay
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Ships in the National
Defense Reserve Fleet—By Design , Maritime
Administration, February, 19 79
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31 ships. Table X presents the most current RRF inventory
and their mooring locations.
Periodically and without advance warning, tests are
conducted to ensure the military readiness of RRP ships and
to provide an assessment of their performance. The operation
involves activating an RRF ship, including crewing, storing,
fueling, conducting 24-hour sea trials, and then positioning
the ship on a military loading berth ready to load--all
within the 5 to 10 day DOD requirement.
In 19 79, the activation of the SS Washington, was com-
pleted in less than 7 days and was kept in active status
for three weeks as a backup ship for REFORGER 79, a U.S.
military exercise. This four month exercise was designed
to test the military strategic mobility system. The SS
Maine was designated by the Military Sealift Command as the
primary RRF ship to be deployed. In November 19 7 8 the SS
Maine was assigned to a general agent, crewed, stored, and
outfitted; proceeded to Port Arthur, Texas, and loaded over
11,00 mts of military cargo for Europe. The SS Maine de-
livered her REFORGER 79 cargo on schedule and was subse-
quently utilized in the redeployment phase of the exercise
returning military equipment to the United States. The
opportunity for the Maine to operate with the MSC and the
Military Traffic Management Command, together with the
"no-notice" activation of the Washington, provided a realis-
tic test of the RRF concept and capabilities [Ref. 5].
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TABLE X
Ready Reserve Force Ships— 1983
TYPE
CS-3-33a
CS-3-33a
CS-3-33a
CS-3-38a
C3-S-38a
C3-S-38a
C3-S-38a
C3-S-46a
C4-S-5 8a
C4-S-58a
C4-S-58a
C4-S-58a
C4-S-58a
C4-S-1H
C4-S-1H
C4-S-1P
C5-S-78a
C5-S-78a
Military Cargo
Military Cargo
VC2-S-AP2
C4-S1-QB
C4-S1-QB
C4-S1-U
C4-S1-U
C4-S^57a
C4-S-57a
C4-S-57a
Military Cargo
Military Cargo
T2-SE-A1J
NAME
Pride
Scan
Lake
Adventurer
Agent
Aid
Ambassador
Banner
Cape Alava
Cape Ann
Cape Alexander
Cape Archway
Cape Avinof
Cracker State Mariner
Old Dominion Mariner
Lone Star Mariner
Great Republic
Young American
Ohio
Puerto Rico
Catawba Victory
President
Lincoln
California
Santa Anna
Pioneer Commander
Pioneer Contractor
Pioneer Crusader
Maine
Washington
Chancel lorsville
LOCATION
Philadelphia
Philadelphia
Philadelphia
James River
James River
James River
James River
James River
James River
James River
James River
James River
James River
James River
James River
James River
James River
James River
James River
James River
James River
Suisun Bay
Suisun Bay
Oakland
Beaumont
Beaumont
Beaumont
Beaumont
Beaumont
Beaumont
Beaumont
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, MARAD, Reserve
Fleet Division, (Phone Conversation) , Washington,
D.C. , June 1983
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In 1981, three vessels were activated by the CNO and were
successfully positioned to receive cargo in less than 10
days [Ref . 2]
.
C. IMPLEMENTATION
Prior to the actual break-out of ships from the NDRF,
several administrative decisions must be made by cognizant
activities within the Department of Navy and Commerce to
insure activation is warranted. The necessary conditions
and procedures for reserve fleet utilization are specified
in the following documents;
1. Section 11, Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 and
Section 902, Merchant Marine Act of 1936.
2. 19 54 Memorandum of Agreement between the Department
of Commerce and the Department of Defense, often
referred to as the Wilson-Weeks Agreement, and
3. 19 67 Memorandum of Agreement between MSC and MARAD.
Sections 11 and 902 of the Merchant Ship Sales Act of
1946 and the Merchant MArine Act of 19 36, respectively,
provide the basic authority to withdraw ships from the NDRF
but only under conditions where the threat of government
requisitioning of commercial shipping exists. The pertinent
passage of Section 11 reads in part:
A vessel placed in such reserve shall in no
case be used for any purpose whatsoever except that
any such vessel may be used for account of any
agency or department of the United States during
any period in which vessels may be requisitioned
under Section 90 2 of the Merchant Marine Act of
19 36, as amended. [Ref. 25]
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Additionally, Section 902 stipulates the following:
Whenever the President shall proclaim that the
security of the national defense makes it advisable"
or during a national emergency declared by proclama-
tion of the President, it shall be lawful for the
commission to requisition.... [Ref. 25]
Thus, a necessary condition prior to activation of the
NDRF is that the threat of requisitioning exists. However,
the authority to requisition can only be granted by the
President when the national security is threatened or when
a state of national emergency is proclaimed.
The Wilson-Weeks Agreement is a long-standing document
whose basic purpose is to overcome maritime industry fears
of government competition. It has as one of its purposes
to prioritize the acquisition of sea assets and services.
In addition, while recognizing the MSC controlled fleet,
it also sought to protect commercial business. In essence,
it dictates that the U.S. government will make full use of
merchant fleet assets before calling out the NDRF [Ref. 16].
The principle behind this is that commercial shippers
want all the government business they can handle. Since the
U.S. maritime industry has a poor competitive position in
world trade, it looks to the government for business on a
regular basis. Thus, the industry desires to be fully
utilized before allowing more ships to be pushed into the
pool [Ref. 26]
.
The government has adhered to policies geared to keep
merchant ships busy. A public law passed in 19 54, and
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still in force today, requires that fifty percent of all
government cargo being shipped overseas be transported in
U.S. bottoms [Ref. 26].
The basic prerequisites for activation of the NDRF also
hold true for the RRF. A separate 19 76 Memorandum of
Agreement between the Department of Navy and the Department
of Commerce, covering the RRF exclusively, sets forth the
authority and procedures for activation. Basically, once
the decision to employ reserve assets has been reached, the
authority to initiate an RRF callup rests with the Commander,
Military Sealift Command. Acting as agent for the CNO, he
determines the ship mix required and the time frame for RRF
deployment. This decision, however, is subject to concur-
rence by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy—Installations
and Logistics, and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Maritime Affairs [Ref. 27]
.
D . SUMMARY
The basic concept of the RRF, to provide a small group
of general cargo ships which would be maintained according
to their general class type, certified, and ready for
immediate callup, is a viable short term solution for reserve
maritime asset response. With the continual rotation of
more modern ships into the RRF fleet, an effectives opera-
tional level of responsiveness can be maintained. As "no-
notice" tests have proven, the RRF has effectively responded
within the DOD-established response tim.e. This indicates
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that when ships are assigned RRF status, they have been
properly maintained.
Consequently, it is the opinion of this author, that
the program has proven itself to be successful by MARAD '
s
ability, in the last few years, to upgrade and modernize
the RRF.
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IV. MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND
A . BACKGROUND
Another source of maritime assets are the ships of the
Military Seal ift Command (MSC) , which was known as the
Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) prior to 19 70.
The MSTS was established in 1949 as the result of the
unification of the Army and the Navy Transportation Services.
Pursuant to a Secretary of Defense directive dated 2 August
19 49, it became an activity within the Department of the
Navy. As part of the Navy's operating forces it is responsi-
ble, through its commander, to the Chief of Naval Operations
[Ref. 28].
The mission of the MSTS; pursuant to the aforementioned
directive of the Secretary of Defense, was:
1. Provide under one authority, the control, operation
and administration of sea transportation for personnel
and cargo of the Department of Defense (excluding that
transported by units of the fleet) and as authorized
or directed for other government agencies of the
United States subject to policies and priorities
issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. To prepare plans for its employment and expansion in
times of national emergency based upon the policies
and directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
appropriate agencies of the Department of Defense and
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to maintain a base organization capable of expansion
to implement such plans.
3. To consult with the appropriate agencies of the
Department of Defense in coordinating execution of
approved emergency plans requiring the services,
facilities
,
and personnel of commercial sea carriers
and in negotiating therefor. [Ref. 28]
With the exception of an undisclosed but probably small
volume of cargo that is carried in regular Navy ships, all
Defense Department cargoes that move by sea do so under
arrangements made by the Military Sealift Command, the
department's shipping agency. Although this command is a
unit of the Navy, and is staffed in part by Navy personnel,
its job is to furnish ocean transportation services to the
entire Department of Defense and occasionally other govern-
ment organizations. The command operates a fleet of
government-owned vessels, all of which are technically in
the custody of the Navy, but only a few of which are commis-
sioned vessels crewed by Navy officers and men. Most of
this fleet is manned by civilian crews in the employ of the
government. A smaller number of other government-owned
ships that have been assigned to the Military Sealift Com-
mand are operated for it by private contractors on a cost-
plus-fixed-fee basis. Together these ships compose the
command's "nucleus fleet" [Ref. 29].
On June 30, 19 72, the nucleus fleet consisted of ninety-
seven dry cargo ships, transports, and tankers. It was
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smaller during the 195 0s, but somewhat larger in the
early 19 60s. It expanded during the Vietnam buildup to a
peak of 134 vessels between May 19 67 and February 1968
before declining again. Despite its small size in 1972, the
nucleus fleet still constituted a sizable fraction of the
entire U.S. oceanogoing merchant fleet, which numbered 6 55
active or temporarily inactive vessels on June 30, 19 72.
The nucleus fleet also contained thirty-five special project
vessels, such as vessels equipped for oceanographic research
that were operated by the command for the Naval Oceanographic
Office and missile-tracking ships operated for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration [Ref. 29].
The size of the nucleus fleet was limited in 19 54 by
an agreement between the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce,
the so-called Wilson-Weeks agreement. Except under condi-
tions of full mobilization, the nucleus fleet must not
contain more than fifty-six transports, thirty-four cargo
ships, and sixty-one tankers [Ref. 29].
The same agreement sets forth the order in which the
Defense Department may turn to other sources for shipping
space. First, it must make as much use as possible of U.S.
liner services. If it needs more space, the department may
charter U.S. flag vessels from private owners. If still more
space is needed, the Maritime Administration may break out
vessels from the NDRF and put them in service for the Defense
Department. Only after these sources have been exhausted
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may the department engage space aboard foreign flag vessels
.
However, the Defense Department is allowed some flexibility
in observing these priorities. A literal interpretation
of the agreement would forbid the use of foreign flag shipping
as long as one serviceable vessel remained in the reserve
fleet. In practice it would often be a reckless waste of
money to activate a vessel solely to carry a small quantity
of cargo that could conveniently be moved aboard a foreign
flag carrier. And so the command has occasionally engaged
foreign shipping although at no time since World War II have
all the vessels in the reserve fleet been placed in service
[Ref. 29].
The substance of the 1954 agreement must be counted among
the most valuable favors that the federal government ever
conferred on the U.S. shipping industry. By a stroke of the
pen the government renounced all intention of operating a
fleet of publicly owned vessels that would deprive the pri-
vately owned merchant marine of a sizable share of the
nation's defense cargoes.
Less than two months after the Wilson-Weeks agreement
was concluded, the Cargo Preference Act of 1954 was signed
into law. Like the agreement, the Cargo Preference Act had
an important effect on the division of military cargoes be-
tween privately owned and government-owned U.S. flag vessels.
Ships of the nucleus fleet and NDRF were implicitly forbidden
to carry more than half of all military cargoes. The agree-
ment and the act neatly complemented one another: the one
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imposed a ceiling on the size of the nucleus fleet and en-
joined the Defense Department from using ships of the reserve
fleet as long as private shipping was available; the other
required that at least half of all military cargoes should
be transported in privately owned vessels [Ref. 29].
In all but two years during the 1960s, government-owned
vessels carried between 20 and 30 percent of all MSC dry
cargoes. Their share briefly exceeded 30 percent in fiscal
year 1967, when more than 170 reserve vessels were pressed
into service to help meet the demand for additional shipping
to Vietnam. As these ships were returned to the reserve
fleet their place was taken by privately owned vessels,
and the share of dry cargoes carried by government-owned
vessels fell. In fiscal 19 72 government-owned vessels carried
less than 10 percent of all MSC dry cargoes. In 19 6 5
nearly half of all U.S. personnel transported to Vietnam
traveled by sea, apparently aboard troopships of the MSC
[Ref. 29].
Table XI represents the MSC controlled fleet inventory
for 19 77.
3. PRESENT CAPABILITY
As the single manager agency for DOD sealift requirements,
MSC essentially performs the same mission as MSTS
:
1. Provide sealift capability for the deployment and
support of U.S. forces and material in an emergency.
2. Develop plans for expansion of sealift capability
during an emergency or in time of war.
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TABLE XI
MSC Controlled Fleet— 1977
NUCLEUS TYPE
RD/PO
m. BUILT
67
SPEED
20.0
M/T
MLTiJOR 24,279
(DMhT PD/RD 58 18.0 17,096
MIREAK C-1 57 13.0 2,651
BLAND C-3 51 18.5 13,222
TOWr.E VC-2 45 16.5 10,446
BPOSTRDM C-4 (HA) 43 17.0 16,985
CHARTERED SHIPS
CAT,TAC2iAN RD/RO 67 25.0 50,044
AMEK RELIANCE C-4 65 21.0 15,800
AMER RAM^Kk C-4 65 21.0 15,450
AMER KACKR C-4 64 21.0 15,800
AMEK CHAMPION C-4 63 21.0 15,400
AMER CH 1 Mh'JAIN C-4 63 21.0 15,400
AMER COURIER C-4 63 21.0 15,400
AMER CORSAIR C-4 63 21.0 15,400
PION CONTENDER C-4 63 21.0 15,400
PION COMMANDER C-4 63 21.0 15,400
PION CRUSADER C-4 63 21.0 15,400
PION CONTRACTOR C-4 63 21.0 15,400
PION MOON C-4 62 21.0 15,400
AMER CHARTIER C-4 62 21.0 15,400
AMER CHAI.I.hMiKk C-4 62 21.0 15,400
TRANSCOLORADO C-4 (HA) 45 17.0 16,552
TRANSCOLLMBIA C-4 (H/L) 45 17.0 16,552
GBKVN SPRING EX C-4 (MOD) 45 17.0 18,874
GPKhlM WAVE EX C-4 (MOD) 45 17.0 18,874
GRKH;N LAKE EX C-4 (MOD) 44 17.0 18,874
GPEEN PORT EX C-4 (MOD) 44 17.0 18,874
443,523
Source: Evers, W.B., An Analysis of the Constraints on the
Activation of the National Defense Reserve Fleet
in a Non-Mobilization Contingency , Master's Thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, September 19 78.
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3. Provide peacetime logistical support by worldwide
sealift of supplies, equipment, and material.
4. Provide, man, and operate ships used for non-
transportation purposes such as oceanographic and
hydrographic research, support of the space program,
and cable laying and repair. [Ref. 6]
With respect to the above mission areas, MSC uses its
own ships, buys space on scheduled commercial liners and
charters commercial ships to fulfill Defense Department
sealift requirements. As of June 3, 19 83, MSC controlled
a fleet of 142 ships. The nucleus fleet consisted of 86
ships: 14 specialized dry cargo ships, 21 tankers, 29 naval
fleet auxiliary ships, 20 scientific support ships, and 2
shallow draft tugs. The command's chartered commercial fleet
includes 56 ships of various types. Table XII represents
the current active MSC nucleus of active ships and Table XIII
represents the current MSC controlled fleet inventory.
TABLE XII
MSC Nucleus of Active Ships— 19 83
SHIP TYPE
COMET RO/RO C-3
JUPITER RO/RO C-7
MERCURY RO/RO C-7
METEOR RO/RO C-4
NORTHERN LIGHT RO/RO C-3
SOUTHERN CROSS RO/RO C-3
Source: Military Sealift Command, Background , 1982
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In fiscal year 1982, MSC delivered 7.3 million measure-
ment tons of dry cargo and 11.1 million long tons of petroleum
for the military services. MSC relies heavily on the U.S.
Merchant Marine, shipping over 9 3 percent of all dry cargo
on privately owned U.S. flag ships, with 67 percent of all
cargo moving on scheduled cargo lines. Approximately 61
percent of all worldwide military dry cargo now moves in
containers. In addition, MSC delivered 18 million long tons
of petroleum products for the Defense Fuel Supply Center and
the Strategic Petroleum Reserve Program [Ref. 30].
Recently the Navy purchased eight large SL-7 container-
ships from private industry; the fastest ships in the U.S.
merchant fleet at 33 knots. Conversion to Roll-On/Roll Off
ships for ground force unit lift equipment results in a
tremendous enhancement in sealift capability to load or
offload in one day the majority of the unit equipment (tanks,
artillery, wheeled vehicles, etc.), for two Army mechanized
or armoured divisions. Sailing time to Europe is four days
or eleven days to the Persian Gulf via the Suez Canal
[Ref. 30].
C . SUMMARY
MSC provides the sealift arm of DOD ' s strategic deploy-
ment capability. During wartime the command would be called
upon to effect movement of the lion's share of U.S. material
and unit equipment when and where U.S. forces are required.
In peacetime MSC, as an integral member of the Joint Planning
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and Deployment community, plays a key role in the development
of joint operations plans for support of unified area com-
manders worldwide [Ref . 30]
.
Wars during the last three decades, particularly the
conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the
Falkland Islands, have vividly demonstrated that sealift
capabilities must be expanded in emergencies. MSC is
working to maintain a core of readily available ships and
trained personnel to help assure its ability to perform its
contingency mission should the need arise [Ref. 30].
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This study has demonstrated that in the past the NDRF,
RRF, and the assets assigned to the MSC have lived up to
their capabilities when called upon. Both during the Korean
conflict and Vietnam conflict, these assets have answered to
the call and provided the necessary ships which were para-
mount in achieving military operational goals. Although
these ships performed well and responded quickly for the
Korean operation, as time went on and as these reserve ships
became older and less than operationally maintained, their
reactivation time became longer and more costly.
As the possibility of war always remains a reality the
U.S. government must in some fashion anticipate the logistical
movement of war materials by sea. The form this task has
taken in the past has been through the activation of the
reserve fleet. What form it will take in the future is
unclear. Although during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts
a significant percentage of war material was moved by ship,
towards the end of the Vietnam conflict the trend was to
move more and more cargo by air.
B. CONSIDERATIONS
Many factors must be considered if a reserve fleet is
to remain in existence and be cost effective; these include:
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1.
Ship Characteristics
Ships must be of such design and have the capa-
bility to independently handle all types of military cargo.
These ships must be continually upgraded to keep pace with
the needs and requirements of the military.
MARAD has appeared to have made progress in rotating
out of the reserve fleet older designed cargo ships and re-
placing them with newer designed ships as the Seatrain Class
and Maritime Class ships. These ship classes are larger,
newer, faster and more versatile than the aging Victory
Class ships which was the initial class.
2
.
Responsiveness
Having an inventory of reserve ships to draw upon
in an emergency has some gratification. However, to be
effective and provide utility to the government these re-
serve ships must be reactivated within the alloted time frame
established by the Department of Defense. This reponse
time is directly related to how well the ships have been
maintained, preserved, and the availability of spare parts.
Again MARAD has demonstrated that ships recalled from the
RRF were able to be reactivated within the maximum 10 day
period furing the "no-notice" tests.
Another contributing factor to the achievement of
this end is the availability of dry dock facilities. This
has become a serious problem as our shipbuilding industry
and maritime fleet continue to shrink in size. The competition
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of foreign shipyards is another ingredient that has reduced
in number U.S. shipyards that can accommodate larger ships.
It can also be assumed that as the U.S. gets more involved
in a war, shipyard space will be at a premium and backlogs
are sure to result in longer reactivation times. Along with
the reduced number of capable shipyards that shipyard
workforce is also continuing to decline. This reduction in
skilled shipyard workers just prolongs even more reserve
ship turnaround time.
3. Cost
As was demonstrated in comparing the costs to
reactivate a ship for the Korean hostilities and for the
Vietnam conflict, reactivation costs had escalated in excess
of 200 percent. A significant contribution to these costs
was the type of preservation method employed and the general
material condition of the ships. As the older ships are
phased out of the reserve inventories so are the older
preservation methods. The newer more effective dehumidifica-
tion methods have been a significant improvement in reducing
reactivation costs.
4
.
Manpower Availability
A continual problem since the Korean conflict is
the availability of qualified seamen to man reactivated ships
Manpower availability has paralleled the trend of the mari-
time industry and becomes even more of a problem as these
qualified personnel establish themselves in difference career
endeavors.
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As Mr. W.B. Evers has ascertained, in comparing optimis-
tic and pessimistic scenarios in the activation of reserve
ships, "...during a contingency situation, commercial ship-
ping will have to be withdrawn temporarily for military use
until adequate reserve shipping becomes available" [Ref . 16]
.
Will history repeat itself? Probably not, at least not
to the extent that was experienced in World War II, since as
early after the war as 194 9 the government attempted to
foresee this contingency and established the MSC, formerly
the MSTS. With the MSC ships currently in operational
status, the immediate impact of a mobilization is lessened
while the MSC buys time so additional RRF and NDRF assets
can become reactivated and operational. Although some
commercial units will undoubtedly be called upon, it is not
anticipated that they will have the same impact as they had
in World War II.
Except for the ships assigned to the RRF the most serious
factor is the material condition of the remaining ships in
the NDRF. Due to their poor material condition, it is esti-
mated that an average of 40,000 manhours per ship will be
required to fully service a reserve ship and make it ready
for sea [Ref. 15]
.
The modernization of the RRF and MSC inventories have
been a significant step in the right direction. Only through
an ongoing modernization program will the initial reserve
assets be conducive to a timely reactivation evolution.
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This goal can only be accomplished by MARAD's continual
effort to involve congressional support to insure adequate
funding to attain these ends
.
The continual expansion of MSC's fleet support program
is warranted to achieve cost savings and conserve military
personnel for combatant ships. The MSC units would be the
first to be activated, and their performance would determine
the scope of si±isequent activation of RRF and NDRF assets.
If the gravity of the situation is significant enough to
warrant more ships than are available from the MSC and the
RRF, the U.S. commercial fleet would have to be called upon.
Because of the trend in our Merchant Marine capabilities
a large scale repositioning of war materials would be a
serious problem. With ever increasing U.S. commitments
throughout the world, a fleet of 57 8 ships carrying only 5
percent of U.S. commerce would be hard pressed to perform
adequately.
In summary, the following conclusions may be drawn from
this study:
1. The United States needs a stronger more capable
reserve fleet of merchant ships
.
2. United States reserve fleet assets must be upgraded
and modernized to meet the changing military require-
ments for war materials and military operations.
3. Regulations and procedures to activate reserve assets
must be streamlined to facilitate timely reactivation
programs
.
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4. The U.S. shipbuilding industry must establish itself
once again to be a competitive force in the world.
5. Government and congressional support is mandatory if
adequate funding is to be made available to provide
a strong foundation from which to build better and
more effective programs
.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
To reestablish the strength of the United States reserve
fleet of merchant vessels into a true, dependable and strong
"Fourth Arm of Defense," the following recommendations are
suggested:
1. Increase NDRP Funding Levels . This recommendation
would insure a more effective preservation and maintenance
program. It would also provide necessary funding to augment
current repair facilities in order to maintain shipboard
equipment in an operational status. With additional funding
a responsive spare parts inventory could be established
which would be applicable to the current ship inventory
needs and prevent snowballing cannibalization problems.
2. Design Military-Cargo-Capable Ships . Working with
commercial shipbuilders the government could provide specific
equipment and design requirements for new ships. The extra
cost incurred by shipbuilders could be offset by government
subsidies or through attractive tax credits, or combinations
of both.
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3.
Leasing of Government Owned Ships by Coininercial
Operators . This alternative would guarantee the availability
of ships, if needed, in a national emergency. These leased
ships would be built to government specifications, which
would guarantee war cargo adaptability and would be a viable
source of ships to resupply the RRF and NDRF fleets. Some
present value analyses have shown that, in the long run,
leasing of capital assets by commercial operators can be
less expensive than outright purchase arrangements, further
supporting the incentive to lease. In addition, if capitaliza-
tion of leased capital assets becomes a reality this would
provide commercial operators an additional tax advantage
which would encourage the leasing alternative.
4. Legislative Involvement . Continual research and
interest by the Congress and the President to find ways to
revitalize the U.S. merchant fleet can only provide positive
results affecting the national defense.
5. Financial Incentives . The government could provide
financial support to commercial operators and shipbuilders
through subsidy and incentive programs, designed as tax
credits to stimulate the shipping industry. Directly con-
tributing to the building of a stronger merchant fleet,
secondary benefits would also be realized, such as revitali-
zing the shipbuilding industry and relieving unemployment
conditions.
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6. Further Study . In conclusion, further studies are
always needed for there are always better alternatives and
different approaches to the same problem, especially one
of this magnitude. Further study focusing on the alterna-
tives is justified if for no other reason than to justify
their validity.
Further, in this era of fast moving high technologies,
concepts and new innovative approaches affecting the
shipping industry will be worth investigating and worth
exploration.
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